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Walker v. Superior Court: Religious
Convictions May Bring Felony
Convictions
Courts and legislatures have long struggled to balance religious
liberties against state interests.' When parents' religious convictions
cause them to use prayer to heal their children instead of medicine,
the state must balance parental religious and child rearing concerns
against the state's interest in protecting child safety.2 Common law
provided that parents' failure to provide medical care to their chil-
dren, because of a religious belief in prayer healing, constituted a
defense to involuntary manslaughter charges based on a failure to
provide a child with medical care.3 In addition, provision of prayer
treatment could exempt parents from misdemeanor prosecutions un-
less a statute specifically required provision of medical care for
children.4 In Walker v. Superior Court,5 the California Supreme
Court deviated from the common law and established new precedent
by disallowing reliance on a religious belief in prayer healing as a
defense to felony child endangerment and involuntary manslaughter
charges .6
Part I of this Note reviews existing case law and California statutes
discussing religious exemptions to child protection policies. Part II
1. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1943).
2. See id. at 164-65.
3. See infra, notes 48-69 and accompanying text (discussing religious defenses to charges
of common law criminal negligence).
4. See infra, notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing prayer healing as a defense
to misdemeanor charges).
5. 47 Cal. 3d. 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988).
6. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 144, 763 P.2d 852, 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1,
22 (1988).
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examines the rationale and holding of the court in Walker. Finally,
part III presents the legal ramifications of the Walker decision.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights to Freedom of Religion
and Due Process of Law
Prosecution for the consequences of religious conduct must survive
substantial constitutional scrutiny. 7 First, laws proscribing prosecution
must clearly define criminal conduct under the void for vagueness
doctrine.8 Second, laws may not prohibit the free exercise of religion
unless a compelling governmental interest exists and there are no less
restrictive alternatives.9 Third, laws can not have the effect of estab-
lishing religion. 10
1. A Citizen's Right to Fair Notice of Criminal Conduct Under
the Void for Vagueness Doctrine
The due process clauses of the United States and California Con-
stitutions mandate that statutes provide citizens with fair notice of
what conduct incurs criminal sanctions." Fair notice requires that
statutes provide a standard of legal conduct as well as a standard
for enforcement and ascertainment of guilt.' 2 Laws which fail to
provide citizens fair notice that their conduct is criminal are consid-
ered void for vagueness. 3 Further, statutory schemes that issue such
inexplicably contradictory commands that an ordinary person could
7. U.S. CoNsT., amend. I. See generally, Development in the Law, Religion and the
State, 100 HARv. L. RE. 1606 (1987)(discussing the constitutional scrutiny applied to laws
infringing on religious conduct).
8. J. NowAK, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 846 (3d ed. 1986). See also U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV.
9. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981);
Developments in the Law, Religion and the State, 100 HAxv. L. REv. 1606, 1711 (1987).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7. See Walker v. Superior Court,
47 Cal. 3d 112, 141, 763 P.2d 852, 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 20 (1988). See generally Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 67 (1960).
12. See Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Burg v. Municipal Court, 35
Cal. 3d 257, 269, 673 P.2d 732, 739, 198 Cal. Rptr. 145, 152 (1983).
13. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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be precluded from making advance determinations as to the legality
of their conduct may also be considered void for vagueness. 14 Cali-
fornia courts will not find that statutes are void for vagueness unless
a thorough review of all available statutory interpretations leaves
uncertainty as to the legality of the questioned conduct. 15
2. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution
The free exercise clause of the United States Constitution protects
religious beliefs from government regulation.' 6 The United States
Supreme Court interpreted the free exercise clause in Sherbert v.
Verner.17 The Court held that the government cannot prohibit indi-
viduals from following their religious precepts unless a compelling
state interest justifies the intrusion, and the state interest cannot be
protected in any other way.' 8 In Sherbert, the Court analyzed a
statute which appeared on its face not to discriminate on the basis
of religion.' 9 However, the statute did interfere with some religious
beliefs by requiring employees to work on Saturday or forego un-
employment benefits. 20 When a Seventh Day Adventist challenged
the statute, the Court declared that facially neutral statutes which
effectively impose on religious practice cannot be upheld unless
allowing a religious exemption would render the whole statutory
system unworkable. 2' Therefore, even though the governmental in-
terest in a smooth functioning unemployment benefit system was
compelling, the Court held that the system could work without
imposing restrictions on religious liberty, and found in favor of the
Seventh Day Adventist. 22
14. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959); Connally v. General Constr. Co. 269
U.S. 385, 393 (1926).
15. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 143, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21. All available
statutory interpretations include statutory language, legislative history, legislative intent, and
case law interpreting the statute. Id. Accord People v. Grubb, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 620, 408 P.2d
100, 105, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772, 777 (1965).
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. I; Developments in the Law, Religion and the State, 100 HARv.
L. REv. 1606, 1609 (1987).
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-10. See Developments in the Law, Religion and the State,
100 HAv. L. Rav. 1606, 1711 (1987).
19. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-01.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 408-10.
22. Id.
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Further, Prince v. Massachusetts established that protecting chil-
dren constitutes a compelling governmental interest2 In Prince, the
Court upheld a statute, which prohibited children from distributing
religious literature in violation of child labor laws, as necessary to
protect the state interest in child safety.2 The case involved a guardian
who allowed her nine year old ward to sell Jehovah's Witnesses'
literature on city streets one evening, in accordance with both the
guardian's and ward's religious beliefs.2 A Massachusetts statute
provided that no minor may sell any magazine or periodical on a
public street, and that no parent or guardian may permit a minor to
work in violation of the law. 27 The guardian, Mrs. Prince, argued
that the statute infringed on both her parental rights guaranteed
under the due process clause and her freedom of religion under the
first amendment. The Court acknowledged that parents have the
right to give children religious training and encourage their children
in religious practice, even against state power asserting contrary
societal sentiment. 29 However, the court found that the family unit
is not above government regulation even against a claim of religious
liberty, and that neither parental rights or freedom of religion are
beyond limitation. 30 Where a child's safety is endangered, the state
has the right to protect the child.3 1 Therefore, the court held that as
long as Massachusetts had correctly determined that its labor statutes
are necessary to protect children, the statutes are not constitutionally
invalid.
32
While laws may not restrict religious beliefs under the free exercise
clause, the establishment clause prohibits the state from taking action
23. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
24. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
25. Id. at 170.
26. Id. at 159-62.
27. Id. at 159. See Mass. GEN. L., ch. 149, secs. 79-81 (1943).
28. Prince, 321 U.S. at 164.
29. Id. at 165.
30. Id. at 166.
31. Id. at 168.
32. Id. at 170. The Court expressly restricted its holding to the facts of the case and
stated that:
Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents. We neither lay the
foundation 'for any [that is, every] state intervention in the indoctrination and
participation of children in religion' which may be done 'in the name of their health
and welfare' nor give warrant for 'every limitation on their religious training and
activities.' The religious training and indoctrination of children may be accomplished
in many ways, some of which, as we have noted, have received constitutional
protection through decisions of this Court.
Id. at 171.
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which favors religion over nonreligion or one religion over another. 3
Laws which afford a uniform benefit to all religions, thus favoring
religion over nonreligion, should be analyzed under the United States
Supreme Court decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 4 The Lemon test
sets forth three criteria a law must meet in order to conform to the
establishment clause.35 Under Lemon, state regulations must serve a
secular purpose, 36 neither advance nor inhibit religion,37 and avoid
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 31
The United States Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente39 found
that laws which discriminate among religions must be subjected to
strict scrutiny by the courts.40 To pass a strict scrutiny test, a law
must be necessary to protect a compelling state interest. 41 However,
denominational neutrality does not prevent states from discriminating
among religions when such discrimination is based on a free exercise
argument. 42 For where a burden falls especially hard on some reli-
gions, the government may accommodate religious practices under
the free exercise clause.4
3
33. See Everson v. Arkansas, 39 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1988). See also Walker v. Superior
Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 148-49, 763 P.2d 873, 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 25. When the legislature
accommodates religious practice by writing a religious exemption into a law, the legislature
must not give an advantage to one group as opposed to another. Everson, 39 U.S. at 103-04.
In his concurring opinion in Walker, Justice Mosk found that the religious exemption codified
in California Penal Code section 270, allowing substitution of prayer therapy for medical
treatment, violates the establishment clause. See infra, notes 79-84, 240-53 and accompanying
text (discussing the religious exemption of the California Penal Code section 270 and Justice
Mosk's concurrence in Walker).
34. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 145, 763 P.2d at 874, 253 Cal. Rptr.
at 23. Accord L. TarmE, AmamscAN CoNsrrrtmoNA LAw 1191 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter L.
TamE]. "[Tihe Lemon v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions ... that discriminate among religions." Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (emphasis in original).
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13.
36. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. One commentator further states that a law violates the
establishment clause if the purpose of the law is to endorse or disapprove of religion. L.
TRmE, supra note 34, at 1204-05; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). To the extent laws limit freedom to act on religious
beliefs, laws may violate the free exercise clause as well. L. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1205.
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. The essential effect of a law cannot be to influence the
pursuit of religious tradition or the expression of religious belief in any direction. L. TmE,
supra note 34 at 1214. "[Laws may not have the effect of] discriminating among different
denominations, except as a consequence of lifting a government-imposed burden on free
exercise; .. ." Id.
38. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. See infra, notes 249-53 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Mosk's concurrence in Walker which applies the Lemon test to California Penal Code
section 270).
39. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
40. Id. at 246-47.
41. Id. at 248, 251.
42. L. TamE, supra note 34, at 1190, 1193.
43. L. TamE, supra note 34, at 1193.
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B. Prior Case Law Addressing Religious Defenses to
Misdemeanor and Manslaughter Charges Based on Criminal
Negligence and Child Neglect
In order for a person to be convicted of involuntary manslaughter,
his or her action, which results in the death of a human being, must
amount to criminal negligence. 44 Criminal negligence has been defined
as failure to do what a reasonable, careful, conscientious person is
expected to do. 45 Courts have grappled with the question of whether
religious beliefs and conduct can constitute criminal negligence.
46 If
religiously motivated acts do not constitute criminal negligence, the
accused has a defense to the charge of involuntary manslaughter.4 7
English courts first discussed the possibility of a religious defense
to charges of manslaughter due to a failure to provide medical
treatment in Regina v. Wagstaffe.4 In Wagstaffe, cited as the com-
mon law rule, 49 the court found the defendant parents not guilty of
manslaughter when their child died under religious treatment. 0 The
court reasoned that since many differing opinions existed on the best
treatment of disease, a parent could not incur criminal liability for
using prayer treatment instead of the more widely practiced medical
method'.5  The court further reasoned that the parents utilized the
44. LAFAvE & SCoTT, CiRnmnrA LAw 668-69, § 7.12 (2d ed, 1986).
45. PLAIN-LANGUAGE LAW DICTIONARY 82 (1st ed. 1980).
46. See Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C.C. 530 (1868); State v. Sanford 99 Me. 441, 59
Ad. 597 (1905).
47. LAFAvE & ScoTr, CR .I.u LAW 671, § 7.12 n.24 (2d ed. 1986).
48. 10 Cox. C.C. 530 (1868). See, Note, California's Prayer Healing Dilemma, 14 HASTiNOS
CONST. L.Q. 395, 397 (1987) (authored by JoAnna A. Gekas) (citing Regina as one of the
first faith healing cases).
49. Trescher & O'Neil, Medical Care for Dependant Children: Manslaughter Liability of
the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 206 (1960) [hereinafter Trescher & O'Neill].
50. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C.C. at 534. See Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 49, at 206.
"Under the common law, no conviction of manslaughter predicated upon an omission to
provide medical attendance from conscientious motives has been reported, and none can
probably be had or sustained." 21 A.i ucAN AND ENousH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 199 (2d
ed. 1902). "Where from a conscientious conviction that God would heal the sick, and not
from any intention to avoid the performance of their duty, the parents of a sick child refuse
to call in medical assistance, though well able to do so, and the child consequently died, this
was held at common law not to be culpable homicide." 1 WHARTON, CRIPMAL LAW § 462
(12th ed. 1932).
51. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox. C.C. at 533. The medical belief of the time would have called
for leeching (to bleed someone with leeches) and the administration of antimonial wine in
small doses. Id. at 532.
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healing method they believed worked best and, therefore, did not
act in a criminally negligent manner.
5 2
State v. Sanford, 3 the first significant American law case to discuss
religious defenses to common law felony manslaughter charges, du-
plicated the Wagstaffe result but not the Wagstaffe reasoning.5 4 In
Sanford, the court held that a parent's decision not to provide medical
care because of a belief in faith healing could not provide the basis
for a manslaughter conviction.5 Whereas the Wagstaffe court found
that parents could not be guilty of criminal negligence for choosing
prayer treatment when many different views on proper treatment
existed, the Maine court in Sanford found that parents could not be
found criminally negligent for applying the method they thought was
best regardless of societal views on the subject of proper treatment.
5 6
The Sanford court stated that, to successfully raise a religious defense,
the defendant must first prove his belief in the healing efficacy of a
certain method.5 7 Then, the defendant must show he did everything
possible to correctly apply the religious practice.58 Thus, the court
established that the guilt or innocence of a defendant should not
depend on a jury's belief about the efficacy of prayer healing. 9
Rather, the jury, in a manslaughter case based on criminal negligence,
should determine whether the defendant did what he felt was best
under the circumstances. 6° Under Sanford, the substitution of prayer
treatment for medical care could not constitute criminal negligence
when properly done by those with a sincere belief in the efficacy of
spiritual healing.
61
Whereas Sanford addressed religious defenses to felony manslaugh-
ter charges based on criminal negligence, an 'American court first
discussed religious defenses to misdemeanor charges in People v.
Pierson.62 In Pierson, the New York Court of Appeals found a father
guilty of a misdemeanor for failing to follow a New York penal
52. Id. at 534.
53. 99 Me. 441, 59 A. 597 (1905).
54. State v. Sanford, 99 Me. 441, 452, 59 A. 597, 601 (1905); Trescher & O'Neill, supra
note 49, at 208.
55. Sanford, 99 Me. at 452, 59 A. at 600-01.
56. Id.; Wagstaffe, I0 Cox C.C. at 534.





62. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
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statute mandating that children be furnished medical care. 63 The
statute specified that parents commit a misdemeanor when they
willfully fall, without lawful excuse, to provide their children with
medical attention.64 The trial judge instructed the jury that the
defendant's religious faith in prayer as a cure for disease and disbelief
in the efficacy of medicine was not a lawful excuse for failing to
provide medical attention and, consequently, did not constitute a
defense to the charge. 65 The Court of Appeals for New York upheld
the instruction and concluded that the legislature intended to recog-
nize only medical attendance, and not prayer, as the proper treatment
of disease. 6
Early American cases, then, set forth two guidelines for determin-
ing the validity of religious defenses. 67 Under Sanford, acting pursuant
to religious beliefs did not constitute criminal negligence and, there-
fore, functioned as a defense in manslaughter cases. 6 However, when
a statute imposed a specific duty to provide medical care to children,
as in Pierson, religious beliefs could not act as a defense to misde-
meanor criminal liability. 69
63. Pierson, 176 N.Y. at 204, 68 N.E. at 246. The charge was brought under New York
Penal Law section 288 which provided that "a person who willfully omits, without lawful
excuse, to perform a duty by law imposed upon him to furnish food, clothing, shelter, or
medical attendance to a minor ... is guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 288
(McKinney 1903); Pierson, 176 N.Y. at 212, 68 N.E. at 244.
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 288 (McKinney 1903).
65. Pierson, 176 N.Y. at 204, 68 N.E. at 246. The defendant belonged to the Christian
Catholic Church of Chicago. Id. The court stated that because the statute created a parental
duty to provide medical care, a parent's obligation to provide medical treatment existed even
if parents were exempt from such a duty at common law. Id. at 206, 68 N.E. at 245. The
New York Court of Appeals discussed the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause of the New
York Constitution and determined that the clause could not invalidate the statute. Pierson,
176 N.Y. at 210-12, 68 N.E. at 246-47. The court stated that its decision does not indicate a
judicial refusal to believe in the efficacy of alternative healing methods. Id. Rather, the court
limited its statements to an interpretation of legislative intent. Id.
66. Pierson, 176 N.Y. at 210, 68 N.E. at 246. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the
legislature did not contemplate the necessity of calling a physician for every trivial complaint.
Id. The court allowed parents a reasonable amount of discretion in raising children. Id. The
court articulated the correct standard to apply in similar cases as "at what time would an
ordinary prudent person, solicitous for the welfare of his child and anxious to promote its
recovery, deem it necessary to call in the services of a physician." Pierson, 176 N.Y. at 206,
68 N.E. at 244. The court determined that prayer treatment is not medical attendance. Pierson,
176 N.Y. at 210, 68 N.E. at 245-46.
67. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text (explaining the two common law
guidelines applicable to religious defenses).
68. State v. Sanford, 99 Me. 441, 451-52, 59 A. 597, 600-01 (1905).
69. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. at 212, 68 N.E. at 244. By the mid-twentieth century,
the majority rule in the United States followed Pierson and rejected religious defenses where
statutes imposed affirmative duties to provide medical care for children. See Note, supra note
48, at 399; Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 49, at 212.
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C. The California Approach to Protecting Children From Abuse
and Neglect
In codifying California's child protection laws, the California
legislature appears to have attempted to provide clear parental guide-
lines which would uphold a parent's free exercise concerns while
protecting minors' personal interests in avoiding pain or discomfort.
7 0
Where parental religious beliefs may endanger child safety, California
courts have had to determine whether to allow religious defenses to
charges arising under child protection laws. 71 Until Walker, California
courts followed the Sanford and Pierson guidelines for allowing
religious defenses to misdemeanor and manslaughter charges.
7 2
1. California Statutory and Case Law Addressing Parental
Religious Defenses to Criminal Charges
Historically, criminal prosecutions of parents for child neglect have
come under California Penal Code sections 270 and 273 a.7 13 Section
273a is California's felony child endangerment statute.74 Section 273a
states that those who willfully cause or permit a child's health to be
injured or endangered are guilty of a felony.75 Unlike the statute in
70. See CAL. NVELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300.5 (West Supp. 1990) (taking prayer treatment
into account before awarding child custody on the basis of neglect), 16509, 16509.1 (West
Supp. 1990) (stating that religious child-rearing practices and spiritual treatment of a minor's
ills are not enough, in themselves, to constitute neglect); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 270 (West 1988)
(allowing reliance on spiritual treatment as a defense to failure to provide for a child),
11165.2(b) (West Supp. 1990) (exempting use of prayer treatment from the definition of child
neglect); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16509 (vest Supp. 1990) (stating that religious beliefs
do not create a need for child welfare services unless the practices present a specific danger
to the physical or emotional state of the child).
71. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 442, 426 P.2d 515, 517, 58 Cal. Rptr.
115, 117 (1967) (finding a father guilty of misdemeanor-manslaughter under California Penal
Code section 270 when his child died after receiving spiritual treatment, in lieu of medical
care, in accordance with his religious beliefs as a member of the Church of the First Born).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1988).
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West 1988). The law states:
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any
child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be injured,
or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person
or health is endangered, is punishable...
Id.
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Pierson, section 273a does not specifically mandate that medical
treatment be used to protect children's health. 76 Therefore, the Pier-
son guidelines do not bar religious defenses to criminal charges arising
under section 273a.77 Instead, California courts have to determine
whether a parent who sincerely believes in the efficacy of prayer
healing willfully causes his child's injury when he chooses spiritual
treatment over medical care.
71
Originally, California Penal Code section 270, similar to the New
York statute interpreted in Pierson,79 mandated that parents provide
for their children's necessary medical care.80 According to the ration-
ale adopted in Pierson, religious belief should not constitute a defense
to misdemeanor charges arising under the original version of section
270, because the statute specifically required parents to furnish med-
ical care.81 However, in 1925, the legislature amended section 270 to
add the words or other remedial care after the words medical
attendance.8 2 By amending section 270 in 1925, the California legis-
76. Id. § 273a.
77. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (describing the Pierson rationale).
78. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 123, 763 P.2d 852, 858, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 7 (1988) (discussing religious exemptions to section 273a).
79. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 204, 68 N.E. 243, 246 (1903) (interpreting New
York Penal Code section 288).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). This section reads in part: "If a parent of a
minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary, food, shelter, or
medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a
misdemeanor..." Id.
81. See supra, notes 62-66 and accompanying text (describing the Pierson approach to
allowing religious defenses to criminal charges arising under misdemeanor statutes). As origi-
nally enacted in 1872, section 270 listed a child's necessities as food, shelter, clothing, or
medical attendance. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (1st ed. 1872). The entire statute read: "Every
parent of any child who willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed
upon him by law, to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for such
child, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id.
82. 1925 Cal. Stat. ch. 325, sec. 1 at 544 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 270). This
amendment was sponsored by the Christian Science Church. Brief for Real Party in Interest
at 12, Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) (No.
SF 24996). The word "remedial" means: "Affording a remedy; intended to remedy . . ." Tim
LIVING WEBSTER ENCYCLOPEDIC DIcTIoNARY OF nH ENGLISH LANGUAGE 810 (1st ed. 1971).
The defendant in Walker v. Superior Court contended that this amendment was intended to
restore the common law rule of Wagstaffe, which exempted parents whose children died after
unsuccessful prayer treatment from manslaughter liability. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 130, 763
P.2d at 863, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12. Cf., Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox. C.C. 530 (citing
England's common law rule); CAL. Crw. CODE § 22.2 (West 1982) (enacted after Wagstaffe
and mandating that english common law, not contradicting the laws of California or the
United States Constitution, be used as the rule of decision in California). The Attorney General
maintains that the legislature did not intend to incorporate the common law rule by its
amendment. Brief of the Real Party in Interest at 13-14, Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.
3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. I (No. SF 24996) (1988). To support this contention,
the Attorney General points out that the English Parliament added the words "medical aid"
1078
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lature may have intended to give parents a choice between adminis-
tering medical care or some other form of remedial care. 3 After the
1925 amendment, California Penal Code section 270 no longer re-
sembled the statute relied on in Pierson, because the words of section
270 appeared to no longer require parents to rely solely on medical
care for their children8 4
California Penal Code section 192 is California's codification of
the involuntary manslaughter charge discussed in Sanford.85 To be
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter under section 192, the
accused must be found to have acted in a criminally negligent or
unlawful manner which results in the death of a human being.
86 If
section 270 requires parents to furnish medical care to their children,
then a parent refusing to do so would commit an unlawful act.
8 7 If
the child dies as a result of this act, then the parent is guilty of
involuntary manslaughter under section 192.88 If, however, section
270 allows parents to choose between different healing methods, and
the child dies after receiving only spiritual treatment, then the parent
can only be convicted of involuntary manslaughter if his or her
choice is found criminally negligent.8 9 The Sanford common law
standard held that administration of prayer therapy by a sincere
believer in the efficacy of spiritual healing could not be a criminally
negligent act.90
The question thus becomes whether the 1925 amendment to section
270 allows prayer healing, as "other remedial care," to constitute
an acceptable substitute for medical attendance. 9 If section 270
recognizes prayer as a legal alternative to medicine, then it can be
used as a defense to a charge of involuntary manslaughter under
section 192.92
to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1868 six months after the Wagstaffe decision. Id.; 31 &
32 Vict. C. 122, § 37; Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 49, at 206-07. The Attorney General
also relied on People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967)
(interpreting section 270). See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text (discussing Arnold).
83. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 120, 763 P.2d at 856, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
84. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (vest 1988) (giving parents a choice between administering
medical attendance or other remedial care to children). See also Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 123,
763 P.2d at 858, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988).
86. Id.
87. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270.
88. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192.
89. Id.
90. State v. Sanford, 99 Me. 441, 452, 59 A. 597, 600-01 (1905).
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2. California Case Law Addressing Religious Defenses in Child
Neglect Cases
The California Supreme Court first interpreted the 1925 amend-
ment to section 270 in the 1967 case of People v. Arnold. 93 Arnold
held that the words "other remedial care" did not authorize substi-
tutes for medical care. 94 Instead, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the phrase created a further necessity parents must
provide their children. 95 The parents in Arnold had administered
prayer treatment for their child in lieu of medical care in accordance
with their religious beliefs. 96 However, the child died from a bowel
obstruction which probably could have been surgically removed up
to twelve hours before the child's death. 97 The prosecution charged
the child's mother with misdemeanor manslaughter alleging a viola-
tion of section 270. 91 Unlike involuntary manslaughter under section
192, misdemeanor manslaughter does not include criminal negligence
as one of its elements.99 Rather, to be found guilty of misdemeanor
manslaughter, a defendant must break a misdemeanor statute and
this violation must result in the death of a human being.10 Thus,
religious beliefs do not constitute a defense to misdemeanor man-
slaughter unless a religious exemption is written into the underlying
misdemeanor statute. 1'0
Had the state charged the defendant with involuntary manslaugh-
ter, the Sanford common law standard would have allowed the
defendant to raise a religious defense to the charge.1 2 Instead, the
state charged the defendant with misdemeanor manslaughter which
put the case in a framework analogous to Pierson, requiring the
court to analyze the underlying statute to see if the legislature
93. 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
94. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 452, 426 P.2d at 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
95. Id. The court found that other remedial care includes enemas, compresses, and prayer.
Id.
96. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 442, 426 P.2d at 517, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117. The parents were
members of the Church of the First Born, a religious group believing in faith healing. Arnold,
66 Cal. 2d at 442 n.1, 426 P.2d at 517 n.1, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117 n.l.
97. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 442, 426 P.2d at 517, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing criminal negligence as an
element of involuntary manslaughter).
100. LAFAvE & ScoTT, CRnmNAL LAW § 7.13 (2d ed. 1986).
101. See id.
102. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Sanford case).
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intended a religious exemption.10 3 Once the court determined that
section 270 required parents to give medical care to their children
regardless of parental religious beliefs, the court found the defendant
guilty of a misdemeanor under section 270 for failing to provide
medical care to her child. 1°4 Because the defendant was found guilty
of a misdemeanor that resulted in a death, the defendant was found
guilty of misdemeanor manslaughter without a recognized religious
defense. 105
In an apparent attempt to bar further misdemeanor manslaughter
charges under section 270 from arising when prayer healing is sub-
stituted for medical attendance, the legislature amended section 270
in 1976 to define "other remedial care" as prayer treatment.
106
However, since the court in Arnold had held that the phrase "other
remedial care" constituted an additional requirement and not a
substitute for medical care, this amendment was ineffective in over-
ruling the holding in Arnold.0 7 Thus, after Arnold and the 1976
amendment to section 270, parents who failed to provide both
spiritual treatment and medical care for sick children were guilty of
a misdemeanor under section 270.108
In 1968, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Sorenson,'09
stated that the principle objectives of section 270 are to secure child
support and to protect the public from the burden of supporting a
child who has a parent able to provide support." 0 Therefore, under
103. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 441, 426 P.2d at 517-18, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117. See also supra
notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Pierson situation).
104. See Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 442-43, 426 P.2d at 517-18, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18. See
supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Pierson standard).
105. See Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 442-43, 426 P.2d at 517-18, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18. The
jury was instructed: "[T]hat it could find defendant guilty of manslaughter if it found that
defendant had violated Penal Code section 270 ... that such violation had caused death, and
that defendant had acted in a manner dangerous to life and knew, or should have known, of
this danger." Id. The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule raises a charge to involuntary man-
slaughter if the misdemeanor results in homicide. Note, supra note 48, at 400 n.49. See also
K. REDEN & E. VERON, MODERN LEoAL GLOSSARY 343 (1980).
106. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 673, sec. 1 at 1661. The amendment stated in part: "If a parent
provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with
the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by a duly accredited
practitioner thereof, such treatment shall constitute 'other remedial care,' as used in this
section." Id. This amendment has been deemed to have been passed in response to the Arnold
holding. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 127-28, 763 P.2d at 861, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 10. See also
Senate Committee on Judiciary Report on AB 3843 at 2, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (discussing the
amendment). See generally 8 PAC. L.J. 415, 422 (1977) (discussing the amendment).
107. See Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 452, 426 P.2d at 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
108, Compare Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967) with CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (illustrating the proposition in the text).
109. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr 7 (1968).
110. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 287, 437 P.2d 495, 500, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 12.
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Sorenson, if the state wishes to prosecute parents for actively harming
children, charges should not be brought under section 270."' Rather,
parental conduct resulting in bodily harm to children may be punished
under the California felony child endangerment law, Penal Code
section 273a."2 Child abuse or neglect which results in the death of
a minor may also be punished under the California involuntary
manslaughter law, section 192.113 The defendant in Walker was
charged with felony child endangerment under section 273a, and
involuntary manslaughter under section 192."1 Under common law,
religious beliefs should have constituted a defense to the charge of
involuntary manslaughter based on criminal negligence." 5 However,
prior to Walker v. Superior Court, California courts had no oppor-
tunity to determine whether they would allow religious defenses to
charges brought under sections 273a and 192.116 Further, Walker
provided California courts with the first opportunity to reevaluate
the Arnold holding since the 1976 amendment to section 270.
II. Tim CASE
In Walker v. Superior Court,' 7 the California Supreme Court
allowed prosecution of a parent whose child died after being treated
with prayer instead of medicine.11 8 By allowing this prosecution, the
court deviated from common law by rejecting the defendant's relig-
ious defense to a charge of involuntary manslaughter based on
criminal negligence." 9 Further, the court found that religious belief
does not constitute a defense to felony child endangerment charges
under section 273a. 20 Thus, the court held that parents must provide
medical treatment for their children's serious illnesses or risk criminal
liability for child endangerment and involuntary manslaughter.'
2'
111. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 126, 763 P.2d 852, 860, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 9 (1988).
112. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West 1988). See also supra notes 74-78 and
accompanying text (discussing § 273a).
113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988). See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying
text (discussing Penal Code section 192).
114. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 115, 763 P,2d at 856, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
115. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text (discussing the common law doctrine).
116. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) (holding that
religious beliefs are not a defense to involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment
charges).
117. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988).
118. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 118, 763 P.2d at 855, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
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A. The Facts
On February 21, 1984, four-year-old Shauntay Walker developed
flu-like symptoms.' 22 The defendant, Laurie Walker, consistent with
the tenets of her religion, 1' began to treat her child with prayer
rather than seek medical aid. 124 She telephoned an accredited Christian
Science practitioner'15 who also began to pray for the child, and
employed a Christian Science Nurse to care for Shauntay. 26 On
February 28th, Shauntay's condition improved after the prayer treat-
ment began; she began eating and retaining food. 27 Her bowel
movements became normal.'2 However, on March 8, the child ap-
peared to relapse. 2 Again, Mrs. Walker and the practitioner prayed. 30
Shauntay's breathing returned to normal but the mother and prac-
titioner continued their prayers. 3' The child died early on the morning
of March 9, 1984.132 Mrs. Walker was indicted on charges of invol-
untary manslaughter under Penal Code section 192 and felony child
endangerment under section 273a. 33 Mrs. Walker filed a motion to
dismiss, but the Superior Court of Sacramento County denied her
motion, and the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 34 The
Supreme Court of California then granted review.
3
1
B. The Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court
of appeal allowing the defendant's prosecution for involuntary man-
122. Id. at 118-19, 763 P.2d at 855, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
123. See M. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEATH WrriH KEY TO Tm ScRn'TUaiS 497 (listing the six
tenets of Christian Science).
124. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 119, 763 P.2d at 855, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
125. Approximately 10,000 Christian Science practitioners exist worldwide. Trescher &
O'Neill, supra note 49, at 205 n.7. They function to assist in healing by spiritual means alone.
Id.
126. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 119, 763 P.2d at 855, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
127. Defendant's Brief at 18-22, Walker v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 266, 222 Cal.
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slaughter and felony child endangerment.'36 First, the opinion dis-
cussed whether the religious exemption in California Penal Code
section 270 excused the defendant's conduct under sections 273a and
192.137 Then the court discussed whether prayer treatment constituted
criminal negligence as a matter of law.'38 Next, the court analyzed
the case in light of the free exercise clause of the first amendment.3 9
Finally, the court discussed the defendant's due process claim of a
right to fair notice of illegal conduct. 40
1. Section 270 as a Bar to Prosecutions Under Sections 273a
and 192
The defendant argued that if substitution of spiritual treatment
for medical care is lawful under Penal Code section 270, then the
same conduct should not be considered unlawful under other Penal
Code sections, specifically sections 192 and 273a.' 41 To determine
whether California Penal Code section 270 provides a defense to the
defendant's charges under sections 273a and 192, the court first had
to determine whether substitution of spiritual treatment for medical
care is lawful under section 270.142 The court reevaluated the Arnold
dictum which stated that other remedial care constituted an additional
necessity that parents must provide their children and not a substitute
for medical care under section 270.1431If prayer treatment did not
constitute an acceptable alternative under section 270, the defendant's
sole reliance on spiritual treatment was unlawful under section 270
and could not bar her prosecution for child endangerment or invol-
untary manslaughter. 44
In reevaluating Arnold, the court looked first to the 1925 amend-
ment of section 270, which added the phrase "other remedial care,"
and analyzed whether the legislature intended "other remedial care"
to function as a substitute for medical attendance, or as an additional
136. Id.
137. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 120-29, 763 P.2d at 856-66, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 5-15.
138. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 134-38, 763 P.2d at 866-69, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15-18.
139. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138-41, 763 P.2d at 869-71, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18-20.
140. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 141-44, 763 P.2d at 871-73, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20-22.
141. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 120, 763 P.2d at 856, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
142. Id.
143. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 121, 763 P.2d at 857, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6. See also, Arnold,
66 Cal. 2d at 452, 426 P.2d at 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
144. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 120, 763 P.2d at 856, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
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necessity parents must provide children. 145 The court reasoned that
the repetition of the word or to introduce both medical assistance
and other remedial care, indicates that the latter does not represent
an additional necessity parents must provide, but rather acts as an
alternative to medical treatment. 146
The court next considered the effect of the 1976 amendment to
section 270.147 The Assembly Office of Research analysis of the bill
introducing the 1976 amendment lent further support to the major-
ity's conclusion by stating that the 1976 amendment shielded parents
who provide prayer in lieu of medical treatment from liability 41
Relying in part on the Assembly Office of Research analysis to shed
light on the legislature's purpose, the court found that the legislature
intended to legalize other remedial care as an alternative to medical
care for the purposes of section 270.149 Thus, the court overruled the
portion of Arnold which stated that other remedial care is required
in addition to, and not in lieu of, medical treatment. 50 The court
then stated that parents who utilize prayer treatment are exempted
from the requirement to furnish medical care under section 270.'15
Having held that substitution of prayer for medical care is lawful
under section 270, the majority proceeded to analyze whether com-
145. Id. "The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain
the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." Regents v. Public
Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d 601, 607, 715 P.2d 590, 593, 224 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634
(1986) (quoting T.M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 273, 277, 682 P.2d 338, 340,
204 Cal. Rptr. 143, 145 (1984)). "Where ... the language is clear there can be no room for
interpretation." Id. (quoting Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 2d 344, 353-
54, 139 P.2d 908 (1943)).
146. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 121-22, 763 P.2d at 857, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6. "[Clourts should
give significance to every word, phrase, and sentence of an act, and that any construction
rendering certain words surplusage should be avoided." Id. (citing Palos Verdes Faculty Ass'n
v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist., 21 Cal. 3d 650, 659, 580 P.2d 1155, 1159,
147 Cal. Rptr. 359, 363 (1978)). The court also stated that to rule differently would present
the absurd holding that other remedial care represents an additional remedy added to the
statute as an afterthought. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 122, 763 P.2d at 857, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
147. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 122, 763 P.2d at 857-58, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
148. Id. "The analysis stated: 'Under this bill, the parents may not be liable for falling to
provide for the health of the child because they choose treatment by prayer rather than
common medical treatment'.. ." Id. (quoting AssEM. OrcE oF RESEARCH, 1975-76 RIG.
SEsS., 3D READING ANALYSIS OF ASSEM. Bm No. 3853 (1976)).
149. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 122-23, 763 P.2d at 858, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The court
recognized that committee reports are not dispositive of legislative intent. However, where
reports do not conflict with the plain meaning of a statute, caucus analyses may present
significant evidence of governmental purpose. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 122, 763 P.2d at 858,
253 Cal. Rptr. at 7. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
section 270).
150. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 123, 763 P.2d at 858, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
151. Id.
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pliance with section 270 provides a defense to sections 273a and 192
charges. 152 The defendant argued that section 270 allows prayer
treatment in cases where health care is necessary.153 Therefore, the
legislature must have intended to allow spiritual remedies for all
illnesses, even in the life threatening situations governed by child
endangerment and involuntary manslaughter laws.Y-4 Under this rea-
soning, the defendant's conduct should not incur felony liability for
child endangerment or involuntary manslaughter.'55
The court rejected this argument and stated that certain conduct,
though legal in one statutory context, may give rise to liability under
separate statutes created for different legislative purposes. 5 6 There-
fore, the religious exemption in section 270 can only provide a parallel
exemption from prosection under sections 192 and 273a if all three
statutes share the same legislative objective.
57
Citing People v. Sorenson,11 the court concluded that the primary




155. Id. "Application of the rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together
is most justified, . . . in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter that were
passed at the same session of the legislature, especially if they were passed or approved or
take effect on the same day, .. ." People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d 562, 585, 580 P.2d 274,
288, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859, 873 (1978). Penal Code section 273a was enacted in 1905 as part of
the same bill which amended Penal Code section 270. 1905 Cal. Stat. Ch. 568, sec. 5 at 279.
The 1905 act stated that the following code sections, which included both section 270 and
273a, all related to crimes against children. Id.
156. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 123-24, 763 P.2d at 858-59, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8. The
court supported its contention by quoting People v. Black, 32 Cal. 3d 1, 5, 648 P.2d 104,
105, 184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 456 (1982): "When used in a statute, words must be construed in
context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear,
and the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular
clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." Id.
157. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 124, 763 P.2d at 859, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 8. See also Milligan
v. City of Laguna Beach, 34 Cal. 3d 829, 835, 670 P.2d 1121, 1125, 196 Cal. Rptr. 38, 42
(1983) (stating that only when legislative policies are symmetrical can one expect code sections
to be symmetrical). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988) (stating that the common law
rule of strict statutory construction does not apply in California; instead, a law should be
construed with regard to language, justice, and legislative intent); People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal.
3d 562, 585, 580 P.2d 274, 287, 146 Cal. Rptr. 854, 872 (1978) (stating that similar statutes
should be construed in light of one another, and that when statutes are in pari materia, similar
phrases appearing in each should be given the same meanings).
158. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). See supra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme Court's rationale in Sorenson),
159. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 126, 763 P.2d at 860, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 9. See also County of
Ventura v. George, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1014, 197 Cal. Rptr. 245, 246-47 (1983); Lyons
v. Municipal Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 829, 842-43, 142 Cal. Rptr. 449, 454-55 (1977)(supporting
the court's finding that section 270 punishes failure to provide for children). See generally
Note, Criminal Nonsupport and a Proposal for an Effective Felony-Misdemeanor Distinction,
37 HASTNGS L.J. 1075, 1079 (1986).
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trast, the court stated that sections 273a and 192 serve as guidelines
for punishment of neglectful parents and are designed to protect
citizens from immediate and grievous harm. 1'
Since the court found different purposes underlying section 270
and sections 192 and 273a, the majority was not required to apply
the religious exemption in section 270 to sections 273a and 192.161
Further, the court found that the legislature did not intend to allow
religious exemptions to charges under sections 273a and 192 which
arise when a "gravely ill child lies dying for want of medical
attention.' ' 62 The court concluded that the legislature allowed pro-
vision of prayer treatment to avert misdemeanor liability for failure
to meet financial responsibilities for child support, but not to bar
felony prosecutions for child endangerment and involuntary man-
slaughter. 163
The defendant argued that because the 1976 amendment to section
270 was passed in response to Arnold, a manslaughter case, the
amendment was intended to bar manslaughter liability. 164 The court,
however, found that the legislature intended the amendment to affect
only misdemeanor liability of parents, and not their exposure to
felony charges under other penal code sections. 165 The 1976 amend-
ment did bar misdemeanor liability for substitution of spiritual
treatment for medical care, and thus clearly barred misdemeanor
manslaughter charges premised on a violation of section 270.16
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the legislature left untouched
the possibility of felony manslaughter prosecutions based on criminal
negligence.167
160. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 126, 763 P.2d at 860, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
161. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 129, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
162. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 126, 763 P.2d at 860, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
163. Id.
164. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 127, 763 P.2d at 861, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 10. See SEN. Comm.
ON JuDIcIRy, 1975-76 REO. SEss., ANALYSIS OF AssEm. BLL No. 3842 ; SEN. REPUBLICAN
CAUCUS, 1975-76 REG. SEss., 3D READING ANALYSIS OF ASSEM. BrL No. 3843. The defendant
rested her contention that the amendment was passed to bar manslaughter prosecutions against
Christian Scientists on two annual reports of the Christian Science Committee on Publication
for Southern California issued in 1920 and 1925. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 127, 763 P.2d at 861,
253 Cal. Rptr. at 10. However, the court considered these reports too far removed from the
legislative process to lend support. Id. Also, the 1920 report pre-dated the 1925 amendment
and was, therefore, irrelevant. Id. Compare supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the legislative intent behind the 1925 amendment to section 270), with Walker, 47
Cal. 3d at 127, 763 P.2d at 861, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
165. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 127, 763 P.2d at 861, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
166. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 127-28, 763 P.2d at 861-62, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11.
167. Id. But see supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text (explaining the common law
principle that prayer treatment does not constitute criminal negligence). A staff analysis of
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2. General Legislative Policy on Religious Defenses to Child
Neglect and Abuse
The defendant next argued that the many other civil and criminal
statutes exempting prayer treatment from the definition of child
neglect indicated a legislative intent to exempt administration of
prayer treatment from conduct within the reach of sections 192 and
273a.161 The court first analyzed child protection statutes to determine
whether the legislature intended to allow prayer treatment as an
appropriate remedy for children's serious illnesses. 169 Specifically, the
court relied on statutes defining neglected or abused children for
purposes of the state child welfare services program, 170 the Office of
Child Abuse Prevention, 7' and the reporting of suspected child
abuse. 72 These definitions state that children treated by prayer shall
not, "for that reason alone," be considered abused or neglected. 173
The court interpreted the words "for that reason alone" to mean
that a child receiving prayer treatment may still be considered abused
or neglected if the provision of prayer treatment combined with a
grave illness results in a serious threat to the well-being of the child.
74
Assembly Bill 3842 stated:
The bill appears unclear in two respects. First, section 273a makes it a wobbler (10
year top) for any person to permit a minor under his care or custody to suffer any
physical harm or injury. Thus, though the parents may not be liable for failing to
provide for the health of the child because they choose treatment by prayer rather
than common medical treatment, they would be liable if the child suffered any
physiological harm. Second, no exception is made under the manslaughter statutes
for parental liability should the child die. If treatment by prayer is to be recognized
in part, the parents should not be liable for the results of using a permitted mode
of healing.
Assam. CoMM. ON CRDMNAL JusicE, 1975-76 REG. SEss., ANALYsIS OF ASSEM. BILL 3843.
Similar statements appear in Assam. OFmcE oF REsEAR CH, 1975-76 REo. Sass., 3D READINO
ANALYSIS OF Assam. BIL. 3843."
168. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 129-30, 763 P.2d at 863, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12. See CAL. WELF.
& INsT. CODE §§ 300, 300.5, 7104, 16500, 16509, 16509.1, 18960.5, 18964(f)(3), 14059 (West
1980, 1984 & Supp. 1990).
169. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 130-34, 763 P.2d at 863-66, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12-15.
170. Id. See CAL. WEL. & INsT. CODE §§ 16500-16525.30 (West Supp. 1990).
171. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 132, 763 P.2d at 863-64, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 13; See CAL. WEL.
& INST. CODE §§ 18950-18964.6 (West Supp. 1990).
172. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 130, 763 P.2d at 863, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12; See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 11165-11174.3 (West Supp. 1990).
173. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 130, 763 P.2d at 863, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12; CAL. VLF. &
INST. CODE §§ 16509.1, 18950.5 (West Supp. 1990); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2 (West Supp.
1990).
174. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 130-31, 763 P.2d at 863-64, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12-13. The court
further supported its with contention section 16509 of the Welfare and Institutions Code which
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The court found that the legislative intent, expressed throughout
California child welfare statutes, clearly provides that when a child's
health is seriously jeopardized, the right of a parent to rely exclusively
on prayer must yield. 175 Therefore, the court found that neither
section 270 itself, or California's child protection laws, show a
legislative intent to relate section 270's religious exemption to sections
273a and 192.176
3. Prayer Treatment as Criminal Negligence
For the defendant to be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, her
actions must be found unlawful or criminally negligent. 177 Since the
court determined that Mrs. Walker's conduct was not unlawful under
section 270, it had to find that she was criminally negligent to
establish a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. 7  The court held
that a sincere belief in the efficacy of prayer healing will not prohibit
a finding of criminal negligence.179 In allowing religiously motivated
conduct to constitute criminally negligent behavior, the court rejected
the common law doctrines of Wagstaffe and Sanford which held that
a parent relying exclusively on prayer healing for a child was not
reads: "Cultural and religious child-rearing practices and beliefs which differ 'from general
community standards shall not in themselves create a need for child welfare services unless
the practices present a specific danger to the physical or emotional safety of the child." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16509 (West Supp. 1990). In addition, section 300 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code, which delineates the circumstances under which a child can be removed
from parental custody and declared a dependant of the court, states that in making custody
determinations, the court should give deference to the parep.t's choice of spiritual treatment
and not assume jurisdiction unless necessary to protect the minor from suffering serious
physical harm or illness. CAL. Wvmi'. & INsT. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1990). See generally
Review of Selected 1987 California Legislation, 19 PAc. L.J. 645, 652 n.14 (1988) (listing the
factors a court must consider when determining if the type of care provided was proper under
the circumstances); Review of Selected 1987 California Legislation, 19 PAC. L.J. 645, 650-58
(1988) (discussing the legislative intent behind the most recent amendments to section 300 of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code). The court also used section 16509.1 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code which states: "Cultural and religious child-rearing practices and
beliefs which differ from general community standards shall not in themselves create a need
for child welfare services unless the practices present a specific danger to the physical or
emotional safety of the child." Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 131, 763 P.2d at 864, 253 Cal. Rptr.
at 13.
175. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 133, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
176. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 134, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
177. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for a finding
of guilt under charges of involuntary manslaughter).
178. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 135, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
179. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
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criminally negligent as a matter of law.18 0 The majority observed that
medical science has advanced to the point where it may be more
fully relied upon than in the days of Wagstaffe when blisters, leeches,
and calomel were the common medical practice, and that conse-
quently it is reasonable to presume that the community standard for
criminal negligence has advanced in accord with medical discovery.' 8'
Therefore, the court held that nineteenth century common law cases
fail to establish a contemporary defense to charges of criminal
negligence arising out of the death of a child treated by prayer
alone.18
2
Next, the court addressed whether the defendant's conduct was
criminally negligent under the California definition of that term
established in People v. Penny,8 3 a manslaughter case that arose
when an unlicensed beauty consultant inadvertently poisoned her
patient while trying to remove facial wrinkles?.84 In Penny, the
California Supreme Court held that criminal negligence should be
determined by looking to the objective reasonableness of the defen-
dant's conduct. 85 Thus in Walker, the defendant's subjective intent
to heal her daughter could not save her from committing criminal
negligence, if a jury found her course of conduct objectively unrea-
sonable. 6
The court rejected the defendant's contention that no reasonable
jury could characterize prayer treatment as criminally negligent. 87
The defendant also asserted that various statutory exemptions enacted
for Christian Scientists demonstrate a legislative acceptance of the
reasonableness of spiritual treatment. 8 However, as discussed above,
the court found that the child protection laws referred to by the
180. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136, 763 P.2d at 867, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 16. See supra notes
49-61 and accompanying text (discussing Sanford and Wagstaffe).
181. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136, 763 P.2d at 867, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
182. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136, 763 P.2d at 867-68, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
183. 44 Cal. 2d 861, 285 P.2d 926 (1955).
184. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17; People v.
Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 880, 285 P.2d 926, 928 (1955). See also, People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal.
3d 824, 836, 828, 836, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 314, 326-27 (1984); People v. Watson,
30 Cal. 3d 290, 296, 637 P.2d 279, 283, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 47 (1981). See generally LAFAvE
& Scott, CRsAxr LAw 590 n.23 (1972) (discussing the standard for criminal negligence).
185. See Penny, 44 Cal. 2d at 879, 285 P.2d at 926; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136, 763 P.2d.
at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
186. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 137, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
187. Id. But see, State v. Sanford, 99 Me. 441, 452, 59 At. 597, 600-01 (1905) (stating
that the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct should not depend on the jury's belief
about the efficacy of prayer treatment).
188. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 137, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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defendant reflect not an endorsement of the efficacy or reasonable-
ness of prayer treatment, but merely a willingness to accommodate
religious practice when children do not face serious physical harm." 9
Thus, the court declined to find that, as a matter of law, the
defendant's conduct was not criminally negligent. 190
4. Prayer Healing as Free Exercise of Religion
The court held that the defendant's actions were not constitution-
ally protected under the free exercise clause, because the compelling
state interest in preserving a child's life outweighs the parent's
religious interest in practicing prayer healing, and less restrictive
alternatives for child protection are unavailable.' 91 The court first
determined that a compelling state interest in protecting, children's
lives exists. 192 Protecting children's lives allows them to mature fully
and become the citizens upon whom the perpetuation of democracy
depends. 93 Then, acknowledging that the defendant acted in accord
with genuine faith, the court found that since use of medicine does
not constitute "sin" for a Christian Scientist, the religious interest
is outweighed by the governmental need to protect its citizens. 94 The
court went even further by stating that the governmental interest in
child safety justifies any form of religious imposition. 95 In reaching
this conclusion the court relied on Prince v. Massachusetts, which
stated that the right to freely practice religion does not include liberty
to expose a child to ill health or death.
96
Having concluded that the compelling state interest in preserving
a child's life outweighs the parent's religious interest in practicing
prayer healing, the court next stated that allowing criminal prose-
cutions advanced this state interest in the manner least intrusive to
189. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18. See supra notes
168-76 and accompanying text (discussing the court's interpretation of legislative intent to not
recognize the reasonableness of prayer treatment).
190. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
191. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
192. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
193. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
194. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
195. Id.
196. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 140, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19. However, the
Walker court expanded the holding in Prince, which allowed religious infringement only when
necessary to protect child safety and limited its holding to the facts presented in the Prince
case. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1943).
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parental religious interests.'97 The majority found three reasons why
the only alternative for child protection advanced by the defendant-
civil dependency hearings' 9 -does not advance the state interest in a
less intrusive manner than criminal sanctions. 99 First, the court
reasoned that parents would rather face criminal liability than have
the state take their child. 210 Second, the court noted that cases like
Walker will not come to the attention of authorities in time to take
protective measures.201 Finally, since criminal liability attaches only
when the child is actually endangered or dies, the penalty is narrowly
tailored to apply only in cases where the government interest in
protecting the welfare of a child is paramount. 20 Therefore, because
the state's need to protect children's lives is compelling, and the
California statutory scheme upholds this governmental purpose in
the least intrusive manner, the defendant's prosecution does not
violate the free exercise clause. 203
5. The California Statutory Scheme Analyzed Under Due
Process
The defendant also contended that sections 192 and 273a, when
read together, violate her constitutional right to fair notice by failing
to provide standards for conduct, police enforcement, and ascertain-
ment of guilt. 2° The court first observed that the statutes are clearly
not meant to be read together, but rather constitute three separate
provisions which clearly identify their respective proscriptions .205
However, even if read together, the three statutes create no ambiguity
for law enforcement officials. 2°6 Rather than allowing prosecutors
197. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
198. See CAL. WELF & INsT. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1990) (discussing civil dependency
hearings). If the court determines that a parent is not properly caring for a child, the court
can adjudge that the child is a dependant of the court and remove the child from the parent's
custody. Id.
199. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 140-41, 763 P.2d at 870-71, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
200. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 140, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
201. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
202. Id.
203. Id. The majority did not address the prosecution's contention that section 270 violates
the establishment clause. Id. However, Justice Mosk discusses possible establishment clause
issues in his concurrence. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 144, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22
(Mosk, J., concurring). See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Mosk's concurrence in Walker).
204. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
205. Id.
206. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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unbridled discretion to follow their personal predilections, sections
192 and 273a require law enforcement officials to make only one
discretionary judgment: "Whether to prosecute conduct otherwise
within the reach of felony statutes in view of the provisions of section
270., "
The defendant also argued that the statutory scheme fails to provide
her fair notice in two other ways.208 First she contended that since,
as interpreted by the court, the statutes allow prayer treatment for
nonserious illnesses, but not for cases in which a child's health is
seriously threatened, sedtions 192 and 273a provide no notice of the
point at which her lawful prayer treatment becomes unlawful.2 9 In
effect, the defendant argued sections 192, 273a, and 270 require her
at "peril of life, liberty, and property to speculate as to the meaning
of penal statutes. ' 210 In response, the court found that a law does
not violate the notice requirements of due process when it requires
an individual to estimate when conduct will incur criminal liability.
21'
As long as sections 270, 273a, and 192 indicate that one must estimate
at which point prayer treatment alone becomes criminally negligent,
the statutes meet the requirements of fair notice under the due process
doctrine.212
Second, the defendant argued that since section 270 allows the
substitution of spiritual treatment for medical care, and such a
substitution constitutes criminal behavior under sections 192 and
273a, the statutes violate due process by issuing inexplicably contra-
dictory commands. 213 The court replied by stating that California
requires citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language,
but also of legislative history, judicial interpretations, and legislative
intent.214 The court stated that if a reasonable and practical construc-
tion can be given a statutory scheme, it will not be held void for
vagueness. 215 The majority found that the protective purposes of
sections 192 and 273a are so clearly distinguishable from the financial
207. Id.
208. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
209. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142, 763 P.2d at 871-72, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
210. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142, 763 P.2d at 871-72, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21 (citing Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
211. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142, 763 P.2d at 872, 523 Cal. Rptr. at 21 (relying on Nash
v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)).
212. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 143-44, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22,
213. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142-43, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21. See supra notes
73-92 and accompanying text (discussing sections 192, 270, and 273a).
214. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 143, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr, at 21.
215. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 143, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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purposes of section 270 that these statutes cannot be said to issue
inexplicable contradictory commands. 216 Thus, the court determined
that the defendant's due process rights were not violated.
21 7
C. Other Opinions
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Broussard agreed
with the majority that the defendant may be charged with involuntary
manslaughter under section 192.218 However, he disagreed that child
endangerment charges are appropriate when a parent has omitted to
provide necessary medical attendance. 219 The Justice stated that the
legislature clearly sought to preclude child endangerment liability of
persons coming within the religious exemption in section 270. 20 To
apply section 273a to those persons would defeat this legislative intent
and render the religious exemption in section 270 meaningless.
221
Justice Broussard reevaluated the majority's determination of the
purposes of sections 270 and 273a.m He began by analyzing the
statutes in light of the conduct they purport to proscribe. 223 The
Justice found that the difference between the two statutes is that
section 270 applies to willful failures to provide care, whereas section
273a punishes intentional, active conduct resulting in harm or en-
dangerment of children.2 Therefore, because the prosecution charged
the defendant with failure to provide necessary care, section 270
should govern the defendant's conduct instead of section 273a. 25
Justice Broussard then argued that even though sections 270 and
273a address different issues, they share the common purpose of
216. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 143-44, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22. See supra notes
141-67 and accompanying text (discussing the different purposes of sections 192, 270, and
273a).
217. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 144, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
218. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 151, 763 P.2d at 878, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
219. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
220. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 152, 763 P.2d at 878, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
221. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
222. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
223. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 763 P.2d at 878-79, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
224. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 153, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
225. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 153-54, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). "There can be no rational doubt that the Legislature intended that
section 270 should be applicable where a parent fails to provide medical care endangering the
health or person of a child." Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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avoiding child endangerment. 226 The language of section 270 mandates
that parents provide necessary medical treatment. 227 Since medical
treatment is only necessary when a child's health is endangered,
section 270 must apply to child-endangering conduct as does section
273a.m
Justice Broussard expressly rejected the majority's contention that
section 270 only serves as an economic regulation. 229 The legislative
history of section 270 clearly indicated that section 270 functions to
shield those parents who substitute prayer for medical care from
liability.230 To find that the legislature, by adding the 1925 and 1976
amendments to section 270, intended only to exempt parents from a
duty to pay for medical care develops an absurd conclusion.231 Justice
Broussard found that both sections 270 and 273a apply to child
endangerment.
22
Since both statutes apply to child endangerment and both appear
in the Penal Code, the sections must be construed together to
harmonize the law .2 3 Section 270 imposes criminal liability on parents
who willfully omit to provide health care, thereby endangering their
226. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting) Since both statutes are Penal Code
sections, they should be construed with reference to the entire statutory system in which they
form a part in such a way as to achieve harmony among the sections. Id. (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles 71 Cal. 2d 907,
918, 458 P.2d 33, 37, 80 Cal. Rptr. 89, 96 (1969)).
227. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 153-54, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
228. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 154, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
229. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting) Even though the third sentence of
section 270 provides that a parent may still incur liability when another furnishes medical care,
that sentence cannot be interpreted to prohibit criminal liability when no one provides the
necessary support. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting) In addition, the principle
case relied on by the majority for their conclusion that the purpose of section 270 is
reimbursement, states that: "IT]he principal statutory objectives are to secure support of the
child" and to protect the public fisc. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 287, 437 P.2d 495,
500, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 9 (1968).
230. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 154, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). See also Review of Selected 1976 California Legislation, 8 PAC.
L.J. 415, 422 (1977). An analysis of the bill introducing the 1976 amendment to section 270
states: "It is possible that a defendant parent who is exempt from prosecution under section
270 cannot be criminally negligent as a matter of law when the defendant's conduct is within
scope of the exemption provided in section 273a." Id. at 423.
231. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 154, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
232. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
233. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting); People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d 562, 585, 580 P.2d 274, 287,
146 Cal. Rptr. 854, 872 (1978); See generally 2A SUIrLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
51.03 at 67 (4th ed. 1984) (discussing statutory construction). See supra notes 156-57 (explaining
statutory construction).
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children, whereas section 273a imposes criminal liability for willfully
causing child endangerment.334 To avoid conflict between the two
sections, section 273a should not be applied to cases where the parent
omitted to perform duties imposed by section 270, but only in cases
where the parents' active conduct endangers the child. 235 In Walker,
the defendant's only active conduct was prayer and prayer is not
prohibited by section 273a.36
Further, Justice Broussard found that applying section 273a to
cases in which the section 270 prayer exemption applies creates a
conflict in the Penal Code.237 He reached this conclusion by finding
that the spiritual treatment clause in section 270 demonstrates a
legislative intent to exempt parents utilizing prayer treatment from
the statutory requirement to provide necessary medical attendance.
238
If the religious exemption is not applied to section 273a, the legislative
intent is totally defeated because section 273a would then make illegal
the same conduct the legislature intended to legalize by enacting the
religious exemption in section 270.239
Justice Mosk, writing a separate concurring opinion, supported the
Attorney General's contention that the religious exemption in section
270 violates the establishment clause of the United States and Cali-
fornia constitutions. Justice Mosk argued that section 270 both
discriminates among religions and fails the Lemon test.24'
First, section 270 produces a bias in favor of certain religious
beliefs.242 As an illustration, Justice Mosk found two groups unpro-
tected by section 270: parents who hold personal beliefs against the
234. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 155, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
235. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
236. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). The United Church of Christ, the
Methodist Church, and the Church of England are beginning to practice Christian healing. 92
CsmuA ScrENcE SmEmmx 3-9 (January 29, 1990); id. 3-7 (January 22, 1990).
237. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 155, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
238. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
239. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 156, 763 P.2d at 881, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
240. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 144, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). Justice Kaufman joined Justice Mosk's concurring opinion. Id. See also U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I; CAL CoNsT. art. I, § 4 (creating the establishment clause). See supra notes
33-43 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment clause).
241. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 763 P.2d at 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13. See supra notes 33-43 and
accompanying text (explaining the requirements of the establishment clause).
242. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 146, 763 P.2d at 874, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
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use of medicine, but who are unaffiliated with a "recognized"
religion, and parents who belong to sects without accredited prayer
practitioners.243 A statute that discriminates between religions cannot
stand unless it serves a compelling state interest.2" Justice Mosk
found that the only discernable state interest in the religious exemp-
tion of section 270 is accommodation of Christian Science practice. u5
Accommodation may be considered a legitimate state objective when
codified to preserve religious neutrality.2" However, he argued that
the legislative attempt to accommodate religion in section 270 man-
ifests only a denominational preference in the face of indistinguish-
able religious conduct.24 7 Therefore, Justice Mosk found the motive
of the legislature noncompelling and determined that the statute is
unconstitutional when strictly scrutinized. u s
Justice Mosk further supported his analysis by applying the Lemon
test. 9 He reasoned that because the religious exemption in section
270 reflects a nonsecular preference, the state intended religious
accommodation.2 0 Thus, section 270 fails the first Lemon prong by
having a nonsecular purpose.2' Further, since the wording of section
270 neatly accommodates the organization of the Christian Science
religion-which accredits practitioners-while precluding use of prayer
by other faiths, the statute illegally advances a religion.252 Finally,
243. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
244. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 148, 763 P.2d at 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
245. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
246. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
247. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 148, 763 P.2d at 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). However, "It may be argued that a valid secular purpose is served by limiting
the exemption under [section 270] to parents who are members of recognized churches and
denominations because of the risk that a parent whose-conduct is actually criminal may in
bad faith assert the exemption as a defense." Review of Selected 1976 California Legislation,
8 PAc. L.J. 415, 422-24 (1977) (analyzing the bill which introduced the 1976 amendment to
section 270).
248. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 148, 763 P.2d at 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
249. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 149, 763 P.2d at 877, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (Mosk, J.
concurring). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See supra notes 34-
38 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test).
250. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 149, 763 P.2d at 877, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
251. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). The Lemon test requires that the whole law have a secular
purpose. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613. The case opinion does not preclude certain sections of
a statute from allowing rational religious accommodation. Id.
252. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 150, 763 P.2d at 877, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). Lemon requires a statute to have the primary effect of advancing religion before
the law is found unconstitutional. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Since Mosk's majority opinion
holds that the primary purpose of section 270 is to ensure parents meet their financial
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Justice Mosk found that the statute violates the third Lemon prong
by requiring law enforcement officials to determine whether a parent
belongs to a "recognized" religion utilizing "duly accredited" prac-
titioners, thereby excessively entangling the state with religion. 253
III. LEGAL RANM CATIONS
The court's decision in Walker is representative of a California
judicial trend toward expanding civil and criminal liability at the
expense of organized religion.2 4 The majority intended to protect
child safety by mandating medical attention for a child's serious
illness. 15 However, the court's decision may not accomplish this
result. Further, the opinion may create due process clause problems.
By applying an objective standard for determining criminal negligence
in cases involving religious defenses, the court may have violated the
free exercise clause.2 6 Finally, the decision may compel legislative
action.2
7
A. Walker Fails to Protect Child Safety
Criminal sanctions may not deter parents, who believe they have
witnessed the effective results of spiritual treatment, from praying
for their children in lieu of providing medical care.25  Jail terms
responsibility, his argument in the concurring opinion conflicts with the majority's view.
Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 124, 763 P.2d at 859, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
253. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 150, 763 P.2d at 877, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
254. See also Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification World Christianity, No. S.F.
25038, Oct. 17, 1988 (allowing a church to be sued for fraud in connection with recruitment
activities); Davis v. United States, No. 87-4170, Nov. 14, 1988 (holding that a parent's financial
contribution to their children's missionary activities are not tax deductible as charitable
contributions). See also Reidinger, Puncturing the Faith Defense, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1989 at 89.
255. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
256. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Walker v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 3d 112, 763
P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) (No. S.F. 24996). Accord Commonwealth v. Barnhardt,
497 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. 1985).
257. See A.B. 2325, 1989-90 Cal. Legis., 1st. Reg. Sess. (amended April 25, 1989) (proposing
amendment to section 270 of the California Penal Code).
258. Memorandum from Sherryl Michaelson to the ACLU Legislative Policy Committee
(March 14, 1989) (on file at PLJ). A survey of over 10,000 documented healings through
Christian Science treatment over the last 20 years include many of children who were medically
diagnosed. Id. The diagnosed conditions that were healed entirely through prayer included,
among others, cancer, polio, pneumonia, acute appendicitis, diabetes, heart disease, blindness,
meningitis, degenerative arthritis, leukemia, multiple sclerosis, kidney disorders, gangrene, and
epilepsy. Letter from the First Church of Christ Scientist, Santa Rosa to the Santa Rosa
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incurred after the death of a child, then, serve only to punish a
parent already suffering from grief and loss, rather than to protect
children. Prince v. Massachusetts allows the government to infringe
on parental religious practices to protect children, but should not be
read as allowing the punishment of parents for their religious be-
liefs. 219 The Walker court might have better protected child safety
through reliance on custody hearings held before serious injury or
death occurs.2m During a custody hearing, the court determines
whether a parent is adequately supplying his child's needs.26 1 If the
court finds the child needs medical attention, and the parent refuses
to supply medical care, the court can relieve the parent of custody
of the child until medical care is no longer necessary.262
Contrary to the opinions expressed by the majority in Walker,26
3
existing laws insure that custody hearings occur in time to prevent
serious harm to the child.2 4 First, child abuse reporting statutes
reduce the risk to child safety by requiring parents to promptly report
certain serious illnesses, and their choice to use prayer treatment, to
the County Health Department.25 Also, others who become aware
that a child is suffering from a reportable disease must report their
knowledge to the proper officials.26 Whereas parents sincerely be-
lieving in the efficacy of spiritual healing may fall to take their child
to a doctor regardless of a judicial decree mandating medical care,
such parents, believing prayer will heal their child, should not fear
Community About the Middleton-Rippberger Case (undated) (on file at PLJ). Over the last
twenty years, the Christian Science Journal and Sentinel have published testimonials of over
6300 healings. Id. At least 322 of these documented healings involved healings of children that
had been medically diagnosed. Id.; Proposed Legislation Clarifying Recognition of Spiritual
Healing, submitted to the California legislature by the Christian Science Committee on
Publication (April 11, 1989) (on file at PLJ).
259. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
409-410 (1963).
260. Memorandum from Sherryl Michaelson to the ACLU Legislative Policy Committee
(March 14, 1989)(on file at PLJ).
261. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1990).
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's opinion on
the effectiveness of existing child abuse laws).
264. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's opinion on
the effectiveness of existing child abuse laws).
265. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3125 (West 1989). See also Christian Science
Committee on Publication for Northern California, Legal Rights and Obligations of Christian
Scientists in California, 17-18 (1988).
266. 17 CAL. CODE REGS. § 2500 (1989). Section 2500 also lists diseases and conditions
which must be reported. Id. These diseases must be reported by anyone having knowledge of
them. 17 CAL. CODE REGS. § 2504 (1989).
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reporting symptoms of serious illnesses to health authorities. 67 There-
fore, custody hearings would better serve the courts articulated
objective of protecting children than would criminal sanctions. With
child custody hearings, a parents' only punishment would be the
temporary deprivation of their children; the children would be treated
with medicine before their health was seriously threatened.
B. Due Process Clause Problems
Walker may violate the due process clause by allowing parents to
utilize prayer treatment for mild ailments but not for serious illnesses,
thus leaving an ambiguity as to when exactly spiritual treatment alone
becomes unlawful2 5 By failing to provide clear guidelines for legal
conduct, the statute may be void for vagueness. 2 9 The Walker court's
response to these due process concerns sets forth two conflicting
guidelines.270 First, the majority allows parents to subjectively deter-
mine when medical attention becomes necessary based on individual
past experience. 271 At the same time, the court requires that parents
objectively determine when a reasonably prudent person would feel
compelled to seek medical aid. 2 2 The contradiction of requiring
parents to rely on both subjective and objective standards poses two
different problems. First, the decision arrived at by a parent based
on subjective criteria will most likely differ from a determination
based on objective criteria, especially in the case of a parent who
has successfully relied on prayer treatment in the past. The Walker
267. If parents will not supply medical treatment to their children because they believe
spiritual treatment is more effective, they may now be less likely to report serious symptoms
because Walker allows parents to be criminally prosecuted if their efforts fail. Therefore,
under Walker, authorities might be less likely to learn of serious illnesses in time to save
children than under pre-existing laws.
268. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142, 763 P.2d. at 871-72, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
269. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (explaining the void for vagueness
doctrine).
270. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d. at 142, 763 P.2d at 871-72, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21. Compare
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) with People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 879-
80, 285 P.2d 926 (1955) (describing the difference between the subjective and objective
standards).
271. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 142, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21. "An act causing
death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to the degree of danger
attending it, by common experience in the circumstances known to the actor." Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913). See id. at 377 (articulating the subjective standard).
272. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 137, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See People v.
Penny 44 Cal. 2d 861, 879-80, 285 P.2d 926 (1955) (defining criminal negligence). See also
supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text (discussing the objective standard for criminal
negligence in Walker).
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court's decision sets no guidelines for determining whether the sub-
jective or objective standard controls when they conflict. Second,
even if the court clarified its holding to state that the objective
standard controls, citizens would have difficulty in determining when
a reasonably prudent person would feel compelled to seek medical
aid. Ordinary persons have no training to make medical diagnoses.
Further, according to Dr. Eugene D. Robin, even a professional
physician might not have accurately diagnosed the onset of the
childhood meningitis contracted by Shauntay Walker. 273 In Walker,
the court's determination of a reasonably prudent person would then
appear to be someone with the benefit of hindsight. Thus, the court
leaves parents no clear guidelines on when a child must be given
medical attendance to avoid criminal liability, requiring parents to
speculate at peril of life, liberty, and property as to the meaning of
the law in violation of their due process rights.274
C. Acting Pursuant to Religious Beliefs Can Now Constitute
Criminal Negligence
From early common law, religious beliefs constituted a defense to
charges of criminal negligence. 275 Wagstaffe held that where a dif-
ference of opinion existed on the proper course of action, a person
could not be convicted of criminal negligence for not following
majority opinion.276 Thus, minority religious views on proper health
care constituted a defense to charges of criminal negligence under
Wagstaffe.277 The court in Walker stated that medical science has
now advanced to the point where it must be relied on in every serious
case; any other opinion regarding proper health care techniques may
be considered unreasonable and, therefore, criminally negligent.
278
273. Robin, Second Opinion, The Press-Enterprise, June 13, 1988. Dr. Robin is a member
of the Stanford University Medical School faculty. Id.
274. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). After Walker, two other cases
went to trial in California prosecuting parents who failed to call a physician for a child who
subsequently died of meningitis. State v. Glaser, No. A753942 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles
County Mar. 29, 1985); State v. Rippberger No. 13301-C (Cal. Super. Ct. Sonoma County
July 16, 1985). District attorneys are planning to prosecute all similar cases. See Sacramento
Bee, February 17, 1990, at B5, col. 1.
275. Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C.C. 530 (1868).
276. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C.C. at 533.
277. Id.
278. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 137, 763 P.2d 852, 865, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1,
14. However, Dr. David Eddy, director of the Duke University Center for Health Policy
Research stated: "We don't know what we're doing in medicine." San Jose Mercury News,
February 18, 1990 at 23A, col. 1.
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While the court supports its conclusion by stating that medical care
has advanced from the days of Wagstaffe when leeches and blisters
were common medical practice, the court fails to address the fact
that the death rate for meningitis in hospitals today ranges from ten
to fifteen percent. 279 Under Walker, all forms of health care other
than medicine, including herbal, chiropractic, acupuncture, and spir-
itual treatment, may potentially constitute grounds for criminal neg-
ligence. Thus, the Walker court effectively outlaws differing opinions
on health care and establishes that medical science is the only legally
safe form of health care. Whether any other form of health care is
legal will now depend on a jury's determination of the reasonableness
of the chosen method.
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard20
held that the free exercise clause forbids judicial scrutiny of the
reasonableness of a defendant's religious beliefs. 28' However, by
applying an objective standard for determining criminal negligence
in religious defense cases, the Walker court demands that juries
determine the reasonableness of a belief in the efficacy of spiritual
treatment. Therefore, the Walker decision, utilizing an objective
standard for determining criminal negligence in religious defense
cases, may be unconstitutional under the free exercise clause. 12
D. Possible Legislative Responses to Walker
The Walker court may have misinterpreted what the California
legislature intended to accomplish by enacting the 1976 amendment
279. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136, 763 P.2d at 864, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 13; Robin, Second
Opinion, The Press-Enterprise, June 13, 1988. Of those that survive under medical care,
approximately 205lo suffer brain damage. Brief for Real Party in Interest at 6, Walker v.
Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) (No. S.F. 24996).
Christian Science has healed medically diagnosed meningitis cases. 89 CmusTIAN ScmNcn
SExnmiqm 29-30 (May 11, 1987). See supra note 259 (discussing other cases healed through
Christian Science treatment).
280. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
281. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). Accord Thomas v. Review Bd.
of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1980); Founding Church of Scientology
of Washington D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1969) (stating that courts cannot resolve disputes which require tribunals to weigh the
significance and meaning of religious doctrines). Laurence Tribe states that courts can test a
religious believer's sincerity, but not evaluate a religious belief's reasonableness. L. Tiuma,
supra note 34, at 1182. He further states that: "Judicial scrutiny of the rationality and verity
of a defendant's religious beliefs is forbidden." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Walker
v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) (No. SF 24996).
282. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Walker v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 3d 112, 763
P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) (No. S.F. 24996). Accord Commonwealth v. Barnhardt,
497 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. 1985).
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to section 270. 283 Rather than limiting parental religious exemptions
to the support duty prescribed by section 270, the legislature may
have intended to exonerate parents who utilize spiritual treatment
for their children, in lieu of medical care, from all criminal liability.2
If the court did misinterpret legislative intent, the California legis-
lature should amend section 270 to clarify that the religious exemption
applies to all California penal statutes.2
5
In enacting an amendment to section 270, the legislature could
protect child safety by allowing only religious healing methods with
a proven record of efficacy to act as a substitute for medical care.
28 6
The legislature could also expand the definition of "other remedial
care" in section 270 to include other nonreligious healing methods
which have proven effective in the past, such as acupuncture or
chiropractics. A legislative amendment to section 270 should provide
secular standards for determining which methods constitute legal
conduct, thus avoiding the establishment clause problems Justice
Mosk found to exist in the current version of section 270.
21
7
283. See A.B. 2325, 1989-90 Cal. Legis., Ist. Reg. Sess. (amended April 25, 1989) (proposing
amendment to California Penal Code section 270).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. The code sections relied on by the majority to indicate legislative intent may show
that the legislature intended to allow effective religious healing methods to be applied to
children. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's finding of
legislative intent). For instance, section 16509.1 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code states: "Cultural and religious child-rearing practices and beliefs which differ from
general community standards shall not in themselves create a need for child welfare services
unless the practices present a specific danger to the physical or emotional safety of the child."
CA.. WEa. & INsT. CODE § 16509.1 (West 1989). A religious method that has a record of
healing efficacy should not present a specific danger to the child. See R. PEEL, SPI1trruAL
HEALiNG IN A ScIENTic AGE (1987) (discussing instances where illnesses medically diagnosed
as fatal have been healed with Christian Science); THE CausmTAN SCIENCE PUausmNo SOCETY,
A CEmnxY oF CMnImsN SCMNCE HEALING (1966) (presenting many specific accounts of
Christian Science healing). See also AB 2325, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989) (stating that no
parent shall be subject to prosecution under any penal code provision for failing to provide
medical care if the parent has provided spiritual treatment in lieu of medical care).
287. See supra notes 240-53 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Mosk's contention
that Penal Code section 270 violates the establishment clause). Amendments to section 270
should pass the Larson strict scrutiny test because the statute imposed burdens on religions
practicing prayer healing. Therefore, the government may accommodate religions practicing
prayer healing under the free exercise clause. L. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CoNsTrrLoNAL LAw 1193
(2d ed. 1988). "Larson's neutrality principle does not extend to cases where the state's
denominational line is based on free exercise values." Id. Further, section 270 protects children
by imposing a duty on parents to provide necessary food, shelter, clothing, and health care.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). Therefore, the statute has a secular purpose. See id.
The statute also has the primary effect of protecting children. See id. However, a religious
exemption should not involve law enforcement officials in excessive entanglement with religion
by forcing them to determine which religions are established and effective without secular
based guidelines dictating these decisions. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Mosk's objection to section 270 under the third prong of the Lemon test).
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Bills have been introduced in the California legislature which strive
to accomplish these objectives by recognizing three alternative meth-
ods for establishing the efficacy of a healing method.23 First, the
fees and expenses connected with treatment must be deductible from
either federal or state income tax.2 9 Alternatively, the expenses related
to the treatment must be reimbursable under state licensed insurance
plans.290 As a final alternative, the healing method must be recognized
by public or private health authorities as providing a success rate
comparable to that of medical science. 291 Using these secular stan-
dards, law enforcement officials will be able to determine whether
to prosecute a parent without entangling themselves with individual
religious beliefs. Therefore, the statute would no longer present
establishment clause concerns. Further, by limiting permitted parental
religious practice to those methods which have been proven effective
for healing, the statute should adequately protect children in com-
pliance with the Walker court's articulated objective. 292 Finally, the
statute would not restrict parents to use of medical practice but
would allow a choice between all healing methods with a proven
record of efficacy. Thus, the statute, instead of creating a denomi-
national preference, would merely acknowledge legal alternatives to




With child safety as a compelling concern, the Walker court
balanced religious liberty against the governmental interest in a child's
life. 294 The majority held that parents may use prayer healing for
their children's mild ailments.295 However, when serious illness threat-
288. See A.B. 2325, 1989-90 Cal. Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (amended April 25, 1989) (proposing
amendment to California Penal Code section 270). However, the proposed amendment only





292. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (stating that the Walker court was
motivated to protect child safety).
293. See supra notes 240-53 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Mosk's establishment
clause objections to section 270).
294. See supra notes 192-04 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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ens minors with injury or death, parents must seek medical aid. 296
In so holding, the court has deviated from the common law which
allowed religious defenses to charges of criminal negligence. 297
The court's decision may serve only to punish parents while failing
to fulfill its stated intention to protect child safety.298 Walker also
fails to clarify when prayer treatment becomes unlawful. 299 The
decision may violate the free exercise clause by allowing juries to
determine the reasonableness of religious beliefs. °° Finally, the de-
cision may cause the legislature to exonerate parents from criminal
liability imposed for using prayer treatment and to amend California
Penal Code section 270 to comply with the establishment clause.310
Elizabeth R. Koller
296. See supra notes 178-97 accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 269-75 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text (discussing the possible violations of
the free exercise clauses).
301. See supra notes 284-94 and accompanying text (discussing a proposed amendment to
California Penal Code section 270).
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